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New Zealand Slavonic Journal, vol. 42 (2008) 
Filip Slaveski 
(University of Melbourne) 
"COMPETING OCCUPIERS": BLOODY CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
SOVIET AND POLISH AUTHORITIES IN THE BORDERLANDS 
OF POST-WAR GERMANY AND POLAND, 1945-46* 
"All Poles need to take up arms and fight against the Russian locusts, 
who are not liberating us, but stealing every last bit of our 
property."1 
Such "battle cries" rang out at village assemblies across Poland during the 
spring of 1945, as many Poles struggled to come to terms with the 
paradoxical realities that Soviet liberation from German rule brought them. 
The Red Army expelled the German occupiers who had wrought 
unprecedented tortures and humiliations on the Poles during the Second 
World War, yet it did so at a price. Some Red Army soldiers rampaged 
across the Polish countryside during March and April 1945, raping Polish 
women and looting Polish stores at will, despite the efforts of Red Army 
commanders to maintain military discipline in their ranks.2 Similarly 
devastating to the Poles were the "official" Soviet policies pursued in the 
western parts of the country, such as the wholesale removal of Polish 
industrial plants and machinery as reparations, which heightened fears of 
massive post-war unemployment and economic collapse. Perhaps the most 
difficult aspect of Soviet behaviour for many Poles to come to terms with, 
however, was the Red Army's tendency to protect ethnic Germans from 
attacks by Polish slave labourers and POWs recently liberated from 
German bondage. This was true especially in the borderland areas between 
the Soviet occupation zone in Germany and the new post-war Polish state 
* 
Many thanks to Professor Stephen G. Wheatcroft for his assistance with this article. 1 The above quote was recorded by a Soviet informant who attended a village assembly 
in a regional area of Poznan in March 1945. The relevant Soviet report also provides 
examples of similar anti-Soviet attitudes openly expressed in other areas of Poland. The 
State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF) F. R-7317. Op. 9. D. 30. L. 35. 
Soviet officers on the First Belorussian Front, the Soviet army group which invaded 
Germany via Poland, complained bitterly of the low discipline within the ranks of the 
rear divisions in comparison with the frontline divisions that did most of the fighting. 
They were particularly annoyed with men of the "trophy battalions", those rear military 
detachments that were established to remove military trophies from countries occupied 
by Soviet forces. The most virulent of their complaints are found in the above cited 
report, L. 31. 
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that were administered largely by Polish authorities, yet still occupied by 
Soviet forces during 1945 and 1946.3 
Recent works by Norman Naimark, Philipp Ther and Ana Siljak 
tracing the expulsion of ethnic German refugees from Poland have noted 
the Soviets' tendency to protect Germans from attack in the borderlands, 
yet little attention has been paid to the various factors that account for this 
behaviour.4 It is exactly here that the gap in the literature yawns. Why did 
the Soviet military bother to protect Germans from Polish attacks in the 
borderlands when it was generally unwilling to do so in the Soviet zone? 
How did other Soviet occupation organs react to the violence problem, and 
what consequences did Soviet actions against Poles have for their relations 
with Polish authorities? In addressing these questions the article sheds 
some light on the complexities of violence between Soviets, Germans and 
Poles during the aftermath of the Second World War that complicates 
popular post-war narratives. As importantly, it demonstrates how the 
conduct of liberated Poles, Polish soldiers and especially the Polish 
authorities challenged the legitimacy and power of the Soviets and 
influenced the development of Soviet occupation governance during 1945 
and 1946. In this sense, understanding the "Polish challenge" is essential to 
arriving at a different, more accurate understanding of violence and broader 
3 At the Potsdam Conference the major powers agreed that the Oder-Neisse line would 
form the new provisional border between Germany and Poland. Poland was thus 
awarded a large swathe of eastern Germany consisting of approximately 21,600 square 
kilometres. Although the Soviets gradually handed over administrative authority of the 
territory to the emerging Polish government, they still maintained a presence there 
throughout 1945 and for much of 1946 and retained control over some aspects of 
governance. The article refers to this territory as the "borderlands". For a broader 
discussion of the Oder-Neisse division, see D. J. Allen, The Oder-Neisse Line: The 
United States, Poland, and Germany in the Cold War, vol. 103, Contributions to the 
Study of World History (Westport, Conn.: Praeger 2003). 
Norman Naimark* s short discussion of the expulsions is a most useful introduction to 
the topic. N. M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century 
Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), 122-38. Although a 
number of insightful chapters regarding the expulsion of ethnic German refugees from 
Poland into the zone during the final stages of me Second World War and thereafter can 
be found in a recent work by Siljak and Ther, again, little attention is paid to the 
Soviets. A. Siljak and P. Ther, eds., Redrawing Nations: Ethnic cleansing in East- 
Central Europe, 1944-1948, Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series (Lanham, Md.: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). Also, although slightly dated, Barbara Paul's annotated 
bibliography on the borderlands remains the key English language source on the topic. 
B. D. Paul, ed., The Polish-German Borderlands: An Annotated Bibliography (Westport 
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994). 
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occupation dynamics in post-war Germany and the borderlands evident in 
the sources, yet absent in the literature. 
Central to this understanding is the concept of "jurisdictional 
tension". Soviet occupation organs operating in the Soviet zone were 
assigned contradictory aims and often competed with one another for the 
jurisdictional authority and resources to pursue them. In the absence of an 
effective executive body that could regulate disputes between the organs, 
mounting tensions were inevitable. Of primary concern to the Soviet 
Military Administration in Germany (SVAG), the chief organ charged with 
running the zone and implementing Soviet occupation policies, was the 
indiscipline in the ranks of Red Army forces situated therein, which were 
re-organised after the war into the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in 
Germany (GSOVG). Many GSOVG officers maintained a predominantly 
apathetic attitude toward their troops' violent behaviour toward the 
occupied population, and the officers' unwillingness to discipline offending 
soldiers to any significant degree during mid-to-late 1945 significantly 
complicated SVAG' s tasks in the zone. Many SVAG officers thus felt they 
had little choice but to try and protect locals from attacks by GSOVG 
troops themselves, largely by arresting suspect troops and complaining 
about GSOVG conduct to superior authorities. Many GSOVG officers felt 
that such SVAG behaviour represented a clear encroachment upon their 
authority that needed to be guarded against at all costs. In this sense, 
control over the occupied population, or indeed the capacity to protect or 
attack it, became a signifier of jurisdictional control in an enduring conflict. 
The violent conduct of Polish civilians and military forces toward 
Germans, their tendency to plunder Soviet supplies and reparations loads, 
and the tolerant attitude of the Polish authorities toward this conduct, 
significantly altered the dynamics of the conflict between SVAG and 
GSOVG. Sensing an encroachment on its jurisdictional authority by the 
"wild" Poles who failed to heed the warnings given to them, GSOVG too 
began to operate much like SVAG and took measures to protect the 
occupied population in those areas heavily beset by "Polish violence", 
especially in the borderlands. Establishing law and order in these areas and 
protecting German locals from Polish violence now became a matter of 
jurisdictional concern for GSOVG as well as SVAG. 
Jurisdictional disputes were at the heart of Soviet-Polish conflicts in 
the borderlands, and were compounded within a context of sheer chaos in 
the immediate post-war period that restrained both parties from establishing 
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more effective working relations with each other. One of the symptoms of 
this failure was the repatriate problem during mid-to-late 1945. The Soviets 
faced significant challenges in dealing with millions of Soviet, Polish and 
other European citizens who found themselves in the zone at war's end, 
many after years in German bondage as slave labourers or POWs.5 Yet as 
difficult as the identification, detainment, and repatriation of Soviet citizens 
became, Polish repatriates in the zone presented a far more unique problem 
to the Soviets. Given their limited resources, Polish authorities 
administering the borderland areas were incapable and to some extent 
unwilling to establish effective border controls in the aftermath of the war. 
As a result, Poles were able to cross back and forth over the "fluid" border 
between the zone and the Polish administered borderland territories without 
much trouble throughout 1945 and for much of 1946; even those who had 
been repatriated from the zone by force. Unlike Soviet repatriates who 
could be safely sent back to the USSR once identified and detained, the 
Poles thus possessed a transient quality that significantly inhibited similar 
attempts to deal with them. The chaotic circumstances in the immediate 
aftermath of the war as well as pressing material shortages gave greater 
incentive to many Poles to seek out food and materials across the border. 
The failure of Polish authorities to work together with the Soviets to 
establish better border controls and regulate the transmission of border 
traffic exacerbated a litany of administrative problems for the Soviets. 
Particularly during mid-to-late 1945 Poles regularly crossed the border into 
the zone to strip German locals not only of food but also agricultural goods 
and machinery, which SVAG officers relied upon to maintain the food 
rationing system. The problem reached a climax in the border city of 
Görlitz (Saxony) during September 1945, particularly with regard to the 
theft of horses and livestock.6 Unsanctioned forcible requestions 
contributed so greatly to the food shortage problem in the area because the 
Soviets themselves were already dispatching a large amount of farm 
5 The problems were compounded by the fact that many Soviet repatriates refused to 
return home for fear of prosecution, which was well grounded. Once in the USSR many 
repatriates faced a "filtration" process, whey they would be interrogated by the security 
services and in some cases punished under a range of different crimes such as 
"collaboration with the enemy" etc. Pavel Polian's study is a most instructive work on 
the topic. П. M. Полян, Жертвы двух диктатур: Остарбайтеры и военнопленные 
в Третьем рейхе и их репатриация (Москва: Ваш выбор ЦИРЗ, 1996). For a 
broader study of refugee movements, see M. J. Proudfoot, European Refugees, 1939-52: 
A Study in Forced Population Movement. (London: Faber, 1957). 6 GARF F. R-7212. Op. 2. D. 56. L. 94-95. 
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equipment and livestock to the USSR as reparations. It was difficult 
enough for SVAG officers in Görlitz to try and maintain the tenuous 
balance between reparations requirements and basic living standards when 
they lacked any control over the Soviet reparations teams operating in the 
area without having to deal with the Poles. 
Cross-border robbery was but one aspect of faltering Soviet-Polish 
working relations that further strained the food rationing system; refugees 
were another. The fervent and disorganised dispatch of emaciated and 
penniless ethnic German refugees across the border into the zone only 
further exacerbated material shortages as well as disease. The endless 
complaints made by SVAG officers against Polish authorities indicate the 
extent to which this problem affected SVAG' s ability to properly 
administer the zone. In an October 1945 report the deputy head of Soviet 
Military Administration Mecklenburg (SVAM), General M. A. Skosyrev, 
recounted an all too familiar case of a German refugee echelon arriving in 
Mecklenburg without any supervision.8 The whereabouts of the Polish 
guards who were supposed to have led the echelon into the zone was 
unknown at the time, but one thing that was certain was that they had 
robbed the refugees of all their worldly possessions before abandoning 
7 The tension between SVAG and dismantling organs such as the Special Committee 
(Особый Комитет) has long been a major point of interest for historians of the 
occupation. SVAG could do little to stop the Special Committee's activities, or those of 
the other dismantling roups that rampaged across Germany throughout 1945 and for 
much of 1946. The thousands of Special Committee representatives operating 
throughout the zone were responsible to the commissariats who employed them, not to 
SVAG. They fulfilled reparations orders from their own commissariats and paid little 
attention to the clear consequences that emerged from their behaviour. The recent work 
of SVAG officers who dealt with the Special Committee and other organs perhaps sheds 
most light on these inter-organ conflicts. К. И. Коваль, "Записки уполномоченного 
ГКО на территории Германии," Новая и Новейшая История 3 (1994),  , 
"Работа в Германии по заданию ГКО," Новая и Новейшая История 2 (1995), М. И. 
Семиряга, Как мы управляли Германией: Политика и жизнь (Москва: РОССПЭН, 
1995). 
Although SVAG headquarters were situated in Berlin (Karlshorst), each of the five 
major Lands and Provinces in Germany (Mecklenburg and Western Pomerania, Saxony, 
Brandenburg, Thuringia and Saxony- Anhalt) were administered by a regional military 
administration, i.e. the Soviet Military Administration Mecklenburg (SVAM). 
Skosyrev' s official title was the deputy to the head of SVAM on civilian affairs and the 
head of the Administration of the Soviet Military Administration Province Mecklenburg 
and Western Pomerania (USVAM), the operative body in charge of the day-to-day 
running of the Province. The same pattern of command applied to other Land and 
Provinces in the zone. 
This content downloaded from 128.184.132.53 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:18:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
142 FILIP SLAVESKI 
them.9 Moreover, the guards had not left the refugees with any food or 
water for the long walk across the border. As a result, Skosyrev was left to 
deal with over two thousand emaciated, lice-ridden refugees who were 
completely unfit for the agricultural labour to which they had already been 
assigned (thirty- four had died en route). Instead of alleviating agricultural 
labour shortages in Mecklenburg, the refugees, and the other thousands like 
them that arrived into the zone in a similar state, thus increased the strain 
on the food rationing and medical systems. In response, Skosyrev could 
only plead with his superiors to compel Polish authorities to better regulate 
the dispatch of ethnic German refugees across the border.10 
Ther and other historians of the period have noted how the lack of 
communication between Soviet and Polish authorities regarding echelon 
arrivals increased the strain on food and medical systems in the zone.11 
Little attention has been paid, however, to how the arrivals actually stressed 
internal fractures within SVAG. SVAG exercised control throughout the 
zone via the hundreds of komendaturas that were strategically located 
9 Whatever refugees could keep from the Polish guards was usually taken from them at 
the border. Polish military forces set up checkpoints at various border crossings and 
regularly stripped refugees of their meagre possessions before entering the zone. Border 
robberies were especially problematic in mid-1945. GARF F. R-7317. Op. 7. D. 16. L. 
3. 
10 
Expulsions of ethnic German refugees from Poland into Germany from May to July 
1945 were especially severe, as they were largely conducted by Polish military forces. 
Conditions improved for refugees somewhat from August 1945 after the expulsions 
were formalised and given a legal basis by the Potsdam Agreement (Article ХШ). 
However, even by October the Soviets were still extremely unhappy with the manner in 
which Polish authorities dispatched refugees over the border. Skosyrev's complaint, and 
many others like it from both Soviet and Polish administrators, seems to have had some 
effect by late 1945 as the Polish Ministry of Public Administration ordered all of its 
subordinate authorities to use more humane methods of expulsion. Yet the effect of the 
order was limited. It was only during 1946 that expulsion conditions dramatically 
improved for refugees. B. Linek, ""De-Germanization" and "Re-Polonization" in Upper 
Silesia, 1945-1950," in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 
1944-1948, ed. A. Siljak and P. Ther, Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series (Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman & Litüefield, 2001), 127. 11 Ther briefly discusses this point and provides some additional information regarding 
Soviet complaints against Polish authorities. P. Ther, "A Century of Forced Migration: 
The Origins and Consequences of Ethnic Cleansing," in Redrawing Nations: Ethnic 
cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944-1948, ed. A. Siljak and P. Ther, Harvard Cold 
War Studies Book Series (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 56. 
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across it.12 Each komendatura was responsible for governing a set 
geographical area and was run by a komendant, small staff and military 
force. Refugee echelons arrived at border collection points that were 
situated within one komendatura or another, and most of them simply 
lacked sufficient resources and manpower to deal with the scale of refugee 
traffic. For instance, 142,854 refugees entered Mecklenburg from 1 
November to 20 December 1945. Given their inability to house and feed 
large numbers of refugees, border komendaturas in Mecklenburg hastily 
directed refugees by rail to komendaturas further west without checking if 
the other komendaturas had signalled their readiness to accept them. As a 
result, in some cases overcrowded komendaturas experiencing food 
rationing problems received refugee trains, whilst those in need of refugee 
labour did not. The disproportionate allocation of refugees thus further 
strained housing, food rationing, and medical services exactly in those 
areas where they were least developed.13 
Cross border robbery, repatriate violence and refugees all 
significantly inhibited SVAG's ability to better administer the zone. But the 
Poles were only part of a broader Soviet problem. Whatever the Poles stole 
from German farmers or refugees paled in comparison to the wholesale 
removal of German farm equipment by Soviet dismantling organs 
operating in the zone. Despite SVAG protests, dismantling organs removed 
as much as they could from the zone to compensate war damages wrought 
on the USSR by the German war machine and left SVAG to organise 
harvest collections and spring sowing without adequate horse and machine 
power. And however widespread Polish repatriate violence was against 
Germans; it too was only part of a broader troop violence problem. In fact, 
dismantling and troop violence became the primary complaints levelled by 
the occupied population against the Soviet occupier. 
12 
During the closing stages of the war Soviet military detachments et up their own 
komendaturas, or areas of military administration. The hundreds of komendaturas 
strewn across eastern Germany provided essential services to the occupied population 
living within their designated boundaries and carried out Soviet policy directives. On 23 
July 1945 control over the body governing all komendaturas in the zone passed from 
GSOVG to SVAG as part of the broader transfer of jurisdictional responsibility to 
SVAG after the war. 
This problem is highlighted in a December 1945 report regarding the resettlement of 
German refugees in Mecklenburg. В. В. Захаров, ed., Деятельность Советских 
военных комендатур по ликвидации последствий войны и организации мирной 
жизни в Советской зоне оккупации Германии. 1945-1949: Сборник документов 
(Москва: РОССПЭН, 2005), 202. 
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For those SVAG officers heavily involved in the political 
reconstruction of the zone, dismantling and troop violence significantly 
inhibited their ability to gamer support for the Soviet sponsored political 
parties, the German Communist Party (KPD), and after April 1946, the 
Socialist Unity Party (SED).14 Despite the positive attitudes that emerged 
due to the willingness of the Soviets to protect Germans from attacking 
Poles in the borderlands, opposition parties, anti-Soviet propagandists and 
most Germans across the zone still expounded the narrative of "barbarous" 
Russians and their German communist "lackeys", who attacked "innocent" 
Germans and "stole" their factories. An administrative worker in 
Mecklenburg echoed this narrative of "anti-communist racism" during late 
1945 in conversation with his fellow townsmen, and unbeknownst o him, 
with an NKVD informant: 
The Russians in union with the German communists are the foulest 
of people - the Russian only destroy and burn things. I have never 
met people of such a low cultural level as the Russians.15 
Whatever leverage the Soviets had to explain away troop violence as a 
necessary evil of military operations was lost as the problem continued into 
the post-war period. An August 1945 SVAG report from Saxony highlights 
the problem well: 
Every single outrage committed by our forces, which still have not 
ceased, are being industriously used in propaganda against us and 
disseminated among the population.16 
14 
By late 1945 it became clear that some sort of unification of the KPD and German 
Social-Democratic Party (SPD) was necessary if the Soviets were to create a more 
popular political party mat was capable of implementing SVAG policy directives and 
winning an election. Despite lacking unilateral support from lower and upper echelons 
of both the SPD and KPD, the parties were unified in April 1946 (bar the SPD Berlin 
branch) and formed the SED. The head of the SVAG Propaganda Administration, 
Colonel S. I. TiuTpanov, reflected on the issue of unification in September 1946 with 
members of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). A stenographic record of their 
conversation on this point can be found in Б. Бонвеч, Г. Бордюгов, and H. Неймарк, 
eds., Советская Военная Администрация в Германии (СВАТ). Управление 
пропаганды (информации) и С. И. Тюльпанов. 1945-1949 гг.: Сборник документов 
(Москва: 2006), 208. 15 GARF F. R-7103. Ор. 1. D. 10. L. 9. 15 GARF F. R-7317. Ор. 7. D. 14. L. 245. 
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Given the numerous administrative and political concerns that beset SVAG, 
it is unsurprising that SVAG officers went to great lengths to protect local 
inhabitants from attacks by GSOVG men and Poles across the zone. For 
SVAG, dealing with the "Polish challenge" was but one aspect of the 
broader war it waged for jurisdictional authority and post-war 
reconstruction in Germany. 
The reasons why some GSOVG officers acted in a similar manner 
are not so apparent. Unlike their SVAG counterparts, GSOVG officers 
were not responsible for feeding locals, maintaining law and order or 
reconstructing Germans civil and political structures in the zone. Moreover, 
they often displayed an utter disregard for how their behaviour inhibited 
SVAG from fulfilling these responsibilities. Many GSOVG commanders 
across the zone summarily dismissed SVAG complaints regarding the 
indiscipline of their troops and often refused to punish their men who 
behaved violently toward the occupied population, especially during mid- 
to-late 1945. 
SVAG and GSOVG disputes over such issues arose fundamentally 
from a lack of clarity between their respective command responsibilities. 
GSOVG military detachments were under the direct authority of their own 
commanders, rather than komendants. This was constantly problematic 
because GSOVG military detachments were either positioned in or 
frequently passed through one komendatura or another. As such, it became 
increasingly difficult for komendants to deal with the large number of 
troops located or passing though their komendaturas without establishing 
an operative relationship with the military commander in question. It is 
clear that the formation of such a relationship usually proved difficult. The 
central issue between SVAG and GSOVG was thus who had the right to 
deal with violent solders; their own military commanders or the SVAG 
officers in control of the area which they inhabited. The refusal of GSOVG 
commanders to react to SVAG complaints regarding the behaviour of their 
men arose in no small part because they refused to accept that SVAG 
occupied a superior jurisdictional position in the zone. 
The numerous problems that the lack of clarity between SVAG and 
GSOVG command responsibilities gave rise to become evident from the 
numerous reports in which SVAG officers, tired of their inability to deal 
directly with GSOVG officers in their areas, requested superior authorities 
to intervene on their behalf. The following reports formed part of a larger 
"report writing war" between SVAG and GSOVG officers in areas of 
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Saxony and Mecklenburg who had simply come to the end of their 
respective tethers. Throughout July and August 1945 S VAG officers in 
Zwickau (Saxony) complained bitterly about the behaviour of detachments 
from the Eight Guards Army in the city. The reports claim that soldiers 
from the detachments frequently behaved violently toward locals and did 
not pay any attention to SVAG orders or threats to stop. The public rape of 
women and armed robberies were serious issues, as was the public display 
of violence. For instance, in the city of Plauen during late July a few 
drunken soldiers from a rifle battalion wildly opened fire in a public place, 
fatally wounding a woman. Indicting the tank army commanders for 
tolerating such behaviour, one report states: 
During the course of the investigation officers from these 
detachments not only refuse to cooperate in the identification of the 
specific perpetrators of these acts, but on the contrary, they pursue all 
means in attempting to hide the criminals in order to avoid 
unpleasantness.17 
17 This report is filled with other examples of troop indiscipline. GARF F. R-7212. Op. 
I.D. 13. L 36-38. The problematic relationship between loyalty within military units 
and broader questions of military discipline is one with long antecedents in Soviet 
military history. This was a central problem in Germany during 1945 and 1946 and in 
Russia during the mass demobilisations in the immediate aftermath of the Russian Civil 
War in 1921 . In both cases the military leadership found it most difficult to force its 
officers to implement military discipline in their ranks. In Russia, officers were most 
reluctant o do so for fear that they may encourage mutiny. These fears were well 
grounded as the relationship between officers and men had been strained for a number 
of reasons, none less than the tendency of officers to assume the privileges of the former 
tsarist officer caste and the deplorable material conditions in the army. Fearing mutiny, 
many officers sought to re-establish ties of friendship with the rank and file by turning a 
blind eye to military indiscipline and crimes committed against civilians at a time when 
superior party authorities were calling for a greater crackdown on this behaviour. 
Officers thus established personal links of protection with their men that reinforced their 
command position. Many GSOVG officers did much the same in post-war Germany 
during 1945 and 1946, fearing that implementing harsh disciplinary orders from above 
would threaten their own command position and break apart the cohesiveness of their 
units. Zhukov attempted to address mis situation in September 1945 by introducing a 
"collective responsibility" order that would prosecute officers for their crimes 
committed by their men. Stalin, however, terminated the process. For a further 
discussion of this point see F. Slaveski, "Violence and Xenophobia as Means of Social 
Control in Times of Collapse: The Soviet Occupation of Post- War Germany, 1945- 
1947." Australian Journal of Politics and History 54, no. 3 (2008): 396-97. For the 
Civil War experience, see M. von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The 
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GSOVG detachments in Mecklenburg acted in much the same manner 
during 1945 and 1946, which only encouraged S VAG officers to take the 
initiative and arrest more and more GSOVG soldiers themselves. This 
practice exacerbated existing tensions between the organs, which often 
erupted in attempted jailbreaks, inter-organ brawls and gunfights.18 A 
general of the 5th Shock Army stationed in central Mecklenburg wrote to 
Skosyrev as late as December 1946 to answer consistent criticisms levelled 
at him by the komendant of Ludwigslust over a matter of months. The 
general, also a Hero of the Soviet Union, cited incidents where S VAG men 
stripped local military officers in Mecklenburg of their shoulder epaulets 
and tried to arrest them without sufficient cause, encouraging him to 
conclude that: 
There are clear cases of disciplinary trouble among the officer corps 
and company of the Komendant's administration... It is obvious that 
the officers and the staff of the Komendant's administration... have 
no desire to appreciate correct relations with military detachments. 
Their crudity and tactlessness often arouse animosity among the 
officers and soldiers of these military detachments.19 
Given the refusal of many GSOVG officers to punish their men for 
behaving violently against the occupied population, SVAG officers felt 
they had little choice but to arrest violent soldiers themselves. Yet these 
arrests, and particularly the capricious manner in which they conducted, 
further "politicised" the conflict over military discipline. GSOVG men 
could only interpret SVAG attempts to end troop violence as a thinly veiled 
threat to their jurisdictional authority, which needed be guarded against at 
all costs. 
That this was a predominant attitude among GSOVG officers in the 
zone makes it all the more difficult o understand why GSOVG tended to 
Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 175- 
80. 
The failure of the literature on the occupation to explore the violent battles between 
SVAG and GSOVG has inhibited both an understanding of the central fissures in the 
structure of Soviet governance from which they emerged, and of the consequences that 
they engendered for relations between occupiers and occupied. The author is currently 
researching numerous violent episodes between the organs sparked by jurisdictional 
tensions to help address this problem. 19 GARF F. R-7103. Op. 1. D. 20. L. 334. 
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protect German from attacks by Polish repatriates and soldiers. This 
problem must be addressed both chronologically and geographically. There 
is little evidence to suggest that during their advance into eastern Germany, 
Soviet forces habitually protected Germans from attacks by slave labourers 
and POWs just liberated from German bondage, Soviet or Polish. 
Protection was sporadic, and in any case, Soviet forces were heavily 
involved in attacking locals themselves. The problem of concurrent 
GSOVG and repatriate violence against the occupied population continued 
into the immediate post-war period. By July 1945 the problem had become 
so severe that the joint SVAG-GSOVG commander-in-chief, Marshal G. K. 
Zhukov, was forced to instigate massive zone-wide "clean up" operations 
to identify, detain and then repatriate all "unauthorised persons" from the 
zone, mostly Soviet POWs, recently demobilised soldiers and former 
'eastern workers'.20 In explaining the radical step to his subordinates in 
August, Zhukov highlighted the negligent attitude of GSOVG and even 
some SVAG officers to not only their own troops' violent behaviour, but to 
that of repatriates as well: 
At times, our people extensively permit lawlessness, pillaging, 
violence, arbitrariness and the breaking of all types of law by 
occupation forces, repatriates and from all those who have settled in 
Germany. You yourselves understand that during wartime this is not 
so evident. .but now when the war had finished, when people are 
beginning to forget about it... violence and brigandage is continuing. 
20 Problems between SVAG and GSOVG should have been easier to address given the 
integrated command structures between the organs. In addition to Zhukov* s position, 
the most important integrated structure was the SVAG/GSOVG Military Council. The 
exact nature of council, however, is unclear in the sources. In some cases the council is 
referred to as the GSOVG Military Council, the GSOVG Military Council by SVAG or 
simply the SVAG Military Council. It is clear that some council members enjoyed dual 
position in SVAG and GSOVG, i.e. General F. E. Bokov, General V. E. Makarov etc. It 
is also clear that the council tackled the most pressing policy problems on the ground in 
Germany and was capable of taking joint policy initiatives on pressing issues such as 
troop violence. The council, however, was unable to mediate the numerous local 
disputes between SVAG and GSOVG in a timely fashion, allowing them to spiral out of 
control. This was demonstrative of the fundamental "disconnect" between the GSOVG 
leadership and its officer corps discussed above. The lack of clarity surrounding the 
nature of the Council and the general lack of clarity regarding SVAG-GSOVG relations 
during 1945 and 1946 is discussed in a most recent archival publication. Я. Фойтцик, 
"Заместитель Главноначальствующего СВАТ по политическим вопросам " In 
Советская военная администрация в Германии, ed. A. В. Доронин, Я. Фойтцик 
and Т. В. Царевская-Дякина. (Москва: РОССПЭН, 2009) 
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It is true that this is being committed by individual criminal elements 
[but] this is an extremely unprofitable moment for us... Every act of 
lawlessness reflects badly on our mutual relations [with the 
Germans]... In my capacity as Supreme Commander I demand that 
this situation quickly cease and will not take into account any 
complications of this matter. If it is necessary. . .to shoot several tens 
of thousand of people, then we shall do it.21 
Select GSOVG and People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) 
detachments provided the manpower for the major operation launched in 
August, and although no mass shootings were recorded, the operation and 
associate measures taken by Zhukov enjoyed some success.22 Thousands of 
repatriates and "criminal elements" were detained during the five-day 
operation, which significantly contributed to the reduction in the level of 
violence in the zone. After the operation cases of GSOVG officers assisting 
German locals attacked by Polish repatriates habitually begin to appear in 
the sources. It is thus certainly possible to argue that GSOVG officers 
began to protect Germans from exterior threats once they had been enlisted 
to deal with the repatriate problem, especially those officers located in 
areas heavily beset by repatriate violence. 
This new sense of responsibility may have encouraged some 
GSOVG officers to protect locals and property from repatriate attack. Yet it 
would be unwise to attribute too much importance to it. These mass 
operations only lasted a few days. Afterwards, GSOVG officers could not 
generally be held accountable for the level of repatriate violence in the area 
they inhabited or other problems caused by them. It was pointless for 
SVAG officers to attempt to do so, as it was difficult enough for SVAG to 
bring GSOVG officers to account for their unwillingness to discipline their 
own men for behaving violently toward the occupied population, let alone 
for repatriates. The ineffectiveness of the disciplinary structures allowing 
for GSOVG officers to be removed for either form of negligence was one 
of many factors that allowed both troop and repatriate violence to continue 
throughout 1945, and in a less severe form, throughout 1946. In fact, 
despite the impressive detainment numbers achieved during the mass 
21 GARF F. R-7317. Op. 7. D. 14. L. 12. 
The NKVD claimed that it had detained 2787 Polish citizens by 1 September 1945. 
The actual number was higher, largely because SVAG had also been involved detaining 
Polish repatriates. For the NKVD figures, see С. В. Мироненко, ed., Специальные 
лагеря НКВД/МВД в Германии, 1945-1950 гг. (Москва: РОССПЭН, 2001), 33. 
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"clean up" operations, there is much evidence indicating that many 
GSOVG men still turned a blind eye to the behaviour of both Soviet and 
Polish repatriates, POWs and regular Polish army forces in most areas of 
the zone, and in some cases even joined them in their violent escapades 
against the occupied population.23 
There is thus much archival evidence to support the predominate 
understanding of "Soviet protection" in the literature, best articulated by 
Naimark, who claims that *4he Soviets episodically protected the Germans 
from the Poles, but very inconsistenti/'. This understanding, however, is 
limited by its failure to draw on those sources that demonstrate significant 
distinctions between GSOVG and SVAG behaviour, and perhaps as 
importantly, between the behaviour of GSOVG units operating in the zone 
and in the borderlands.24 As evident from the earlier discussion, SVAG 
concerns over refugees and food shortage encouraged a more 
comprehensive approach toward protecting locals from repatriate attacks 
from mid- 1945 onward. Certainly some SVAG officers were less inclined 
toward protecting Germans than others, as Zhukov's speech indicates, yet 
with the general reduction in the level of troop and repatriate violence in 
the zone by late 1945 and the concurrent rise in expectations of "zonal" 
stability, it became simply more difficult for SVAG officers to avoid 
offering protection to locals without receiving greater censure from their 
superiors.25 
23 
Many examples of "collusion" between GSOVG soldiers and repatriates are possible, 
yet perhaps one of most interesting examples is found in an August 1945 SVAG report. 
A group of twenty-one repatriates and soldiers operated in the northern part of Saxony 
throughout July and August under the command of a senior GSOVG lieutenant, looting 
and attacking German locals at will. The group seems to have survived the "clean up" 
operation launched by Zhukov, but measures were taken by local SVAG officers to 
disband the unit in any case. GARF F. R-7212. Op. 1. D. 137. L. 34. 24 Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, 128. 
A broad reading of reports written by SVAG komendants affords the reader this 
impression. Although many reports indicate an improvement of conditions across the 
zone, a few attract attention because they demonstrate how SVAG officers' expectations 
of "stability" changed as the occupation developed. Namely, how they came to consider 
a relatively lower incidence of rape and murder as a cause for serious concern so 
quickly after the mass episodes of violence seen in the immediate aftermath of the war 
began to subside. From 1 to 20 October 1945, 14 rapes and 104 cases of marauding 
against the occupied population were recorded in Mecklenburg (approx. population 2.5 
million). In response to this "insignificant amount of excesses", to use the reporting 
officer's term, he ordered that the harshest measures should be taken against GSOVG 
men and others responsible for these and similar acts on the basis that if "appropriate 
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It is also necessary to distinguish between GSOVG detachments 
operating in the zone and the borderlands during late 1945 and early 1946. 
It is only in the borderlands that GSOVG protected local Germans from 
attacking Poles to any significant degree, as it is only here that it possessed 
an incentive to do so. In fact, unlike the zone proper, the borderlands saw a 
congregation of SVAG and GSOVG policy aims, primarily, to extract 
resources and industrial equipment from the borderlands and send them 
back to the USSR as reparations. Polish authorities were understandably 
less than impressed with "Soviet extraction", and did little to stop Poles 
from attacking Soviets supply depots and rail cargo to extract their own 
share of the loot. Faced with a common jurisdictional opponent, SVAG and 
GSOVG expectedly reacted to its challenge in a similar vein. 
In charge of guarding cargo trains, rail stations, exchange points and 
shipping docks used to transport material and equipment extracted from the 
zone and the borderlands, GSOVG men were frequently attacked by armed 
Polish bandits.26 In some cases, the bandits were apprehended and 
identified as regular Polish soldiers, former POWs, repatriates from 
Germany or simply local Poles. The border city of Szczecin was the centre 
of this conflict during late 1945 for a number of reasons.27 During this 
period control over Szczecin was gradually being handed over to Polish 
authorities, leading to Soviet-Polish disputes over their respective 
jurisdictional responsibilities to inhabitants as well as their respective 
authority in the city. Szczecin also attracted more attention from Polish 
bandits than other cities because the Soviets used the city's sea port to ship 
off reparations to the USSR. As Polish bandits regularly robbed passenger 
and cargo trains en route to Szczecin, gunfights between the Soviet 
"defenders" and Polish "attackers" became common, sometimes resulting 
in deaths. For instance, on 23 September 1945 a cargo train en route to 
measures are not taken to address this insignificant amount of excesses, it will 
undermine the authority of the Red Army amongst the occupied population." Захаров, 
ed., Деятельность Советских военных комендатур по ликвидации последствий 
войны и организации мирной жизни в Советской зоне оккупации Германии. 1945- 
1949: Сборник документов, 458-59. 26 The extent to which surviving Polish Jews participated in these attacks is difficult o 
determine from Soviet sources, as they tend not to distinguish between Polish and 
Jewish identities in their reports on Polish violence. 
The names of former German cities and areas awarded to Poland at the Potsdam 
conference are referred to by their current Polish names in this article. 
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Szczecin from Grambow was attacked by a group of Polish repatriates and 
regular soldiers of the Polish army. In response: 
The Red Army [GSOVG] guards escorting the train resisted [the 
attack], forcing the four attacking Poles to retreat with one being 
captured. The Pole captured by the guards was found strangled by a 
belt 300 metres from the Grambov [sic] rail station; his corpse 
abandoned. No documents allowing for the establishment of the 
identity of the strangled Pole were found on the corpse.28 
As NKVD investigators had difficulty in locating the GSOVG guards for 
questioning, the exact details of the incident are difficult to trace. They 
nonetheless suspected the Pole was strangled by one of the GSOVG 
guards. 
Such incidents were not uncommon in Szczecin and its surrounding 
areas during this period, and naturally required GSOVG guards to protect 
rail, sea passengers and workers at the scene of the attack. The extent of 
GSOVG protection during 1945 and early 1946 is perhaps most evident 
from an analysis of German mail confiscated by Soviet censors in Szczecin. 
The dominant impression gained from this analysis is that both SVAG and 
GSOVG men were generally considered protectors from the Polish threat 
(not that most Germans could tell the difference between them), and that 
the Soviets were often compared favourably to the "Polish barbarians". Of 
the numerous mail excerpts available in GARF, the following most clearly 
demonstrate this point: 
The Russians don't to anything bad to us and we all live in peace. 
The Poles are the rulers of the town; the Russians are still here and 
protect the people against Polish attacks.29 
Where personal experiences could not be recounted, other letters echoed 
popular attitudes in the area, such as one that concluded that "the Russians 
are more accommodating than the Poles; they are much more 
humanitarian."30 
28 GARF F. R-7103. Op. 1. D. 20. L. 18. 
Mail excerpts are taken from two letters confiscated during mid- August 1945. GARF 
F. R-7103. Op. I.D. 7. L. 249. 30 Ibid. 
This content downloaded from 128.184.132.53 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:18:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMPETING OCCUPIERS 153 
Unlike in the zone where SVAG was primarily concerned with 
reconstruction, in the borderlands it too was primarily concerned with 
extracting resources and infrastructure as quickly as possible. Although 
during mid-to-late 1945 SVAG gradually handed over control of these 
areas to Polish authorities, it still maintained control over various aspects of 
governance that enabled it to keep exploiting the area's resources. Skosyrev 
outlined the enduring SVAG priorities in the borderlands in response to a 
request by the komendant of a small region just north of Szczecin to clarify 
his responsibilities toward German locals made as late as May 1946, 
We do not provide foodstuffs to the population living in the Polish 
areas, and after the end of dismantling, the Germans can organise 
themselves however they wish. The matter is finished.31 
SVAG thus expected the Polish administration to provide foodstuffs and 
essential services to locals, yet also expected them to stand idly by and 
allow Soviets reparations teams to remove as much machinery and valuable 
goods from the areas as possible. Although SVAG officers were especially 
sensitive to how the removal of such equipment in the zone reduced their 
ability to administer it, they expressed no similar concern as to how 
removals affected their Polish counterparts to do the same in the 
borderlands. 
The Poles did not act according to Soviet expectations. Recent work 
by Polish historians such as Janusz Dolega, Lukasz Kulesa and Rafal 
Tarnogorski has traced how Soviet policies such as reparations only further 
strained the patience of Polish authorities in the borderlands.32 In turn, 
SVAG assessments of the komendaturas situated along the border such as, 
Gubin, Seelow and Kostrzyn indicate how the intransigent attitude of 
Polish authorities toward the Soviets only exacerbated the violence 
problem in the borderlands.33 According to the SVAG assessments, 
31 GARF F. R-7103. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 49. 32 J. Dolega, L. Kulesa, and R. Tarnogorski, "The USSR's Implementation of the 
Provisions of the Potsdam Agreement with Regard to Poland," in Polish-German 
Relations and the Effects of the Second World War, ed. W. M. Goralski (Warszawa 
Polski Instytut Spraw Miedzynarodowyc, 2006). 
Much like other cities situated along the border, Gubin was divided into German and 
Polish parts in 1945, the Polish part of the city being named Gubin and the German 
Guben. For the sake of convenience, the article uses the term Gubin to refer to both 
parts of the city during 1945 and 1946. 
This content downloaded from 128.184.132.53 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:18:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
154 FILIP SLAVESKI 
although komendatura officers had established some working relations 
with the Polish administration in Gubin by June 1945 they were unable to 
persuade them to take any sort of action against the 11 division of the 
Polish Army, which regularly robbed and attacked German locals and 
refugees, stole Soviet supplies, or those supplies in the area that the Soviets 
intended to remove for reparations. As alarmingly, the command staff of 
the division regularly took part in these actions themselves, diminishing 
any Soviet hopes of bypassing civilian Polish authorities and appealing 
directly to the staff to establish better discipline in their ranks.34 
Without much assistance from the Polish authorities, SVAG officers 
felt they had little choice but to try and take on the robbers themselves. Yet 
given their light presence in the area, in many cases they relied on Soviet 
security agencies such as the NKVD to deal with the problem. NKVD 
detachments operating in Gubin intervened to stop armed robberies in 
progress and fought tooth and nail against Polish bandits who sought to 
steal cargo on its way into the zone, such as foodstuffs or machinery.35 In 
this sense, komendants enforced law and order in their borderlands 
komendaturas, or at least were happy for the NKVD to do so, because it 
allowed them to better exploit the area's resources. SVAG protection of 
Germans from attacks by Poles by was thus as much product of their 
exploitative purposes in the area, as that of GSOVG. 
The confluence of SVAG and GSOVG policy concerns in Szczecin 
and other cities in the borderlands, none less than exploiting resources, both 
encouraged an increase in violence and an increase in protection. Polish 
authorities had some claim to the resources extracted from the borderlands 
in view of the fact that they were expected to draw on them when providing 
essential services to inhabitants. Even taking into account the limited 
authority and reach of the Polish authorities during mid-to-late 1945 and 
the chaotic conditions in the borderlands that made administering them all 
the more difficult, it was only to be expected that Polish authorities would 
do little to stop Polish soldiers and others from exacting their share. And it 
was exactly the nature and degree of arbitrary violence meted out by the 
34 The investigation into the state of border komendaturas was conducted by Colonel S. 
M. Shestakov in June 1945. GARF. F. R-7317. Op. 7. D. 16. 2-4. 
Colonel Shestakov' s report cited above indicates that the NKVD detachments 
operating in the rear of the Red Army had been tracking the movement of Polish bandits 
for weeks, and had managed to make some arrests by June 1945. 
This content downloaded from 128.184.132.53 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 01:18:58 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
COMPETING OCCUPIERS 155 
Poles that required the Soviets to extend their protection of cargo loads to 
human beings. 
In many ways, the SVAG-GSOVG relationship in the borderlands was a 
microcosm of successful interaction that could simply not be reproduced in 
the zone. In the zone jurisdictional tension between SVAG and GSOVG 
inhibited them from adopting a most necessary cooperative approach 
toward the troop violence problem. SVAG attempts to deal with problem 
independently were only seen by GSOVG as an encroachment onto their 
authority that needed to be guarded against, if not repelled with violence. 
The situation was different in the borderlands. Here GSOVG attacks 
against locals were overshadowed by "Polish violence", which was at least 
tacitly supported by Polish authorities during 1945. The borderlands also 
saw the entrance of a third jurisdictional combatant into the conflict 
between SVAG and GSOVG. The need to protect their shared 
jurisdictional right to exploitation bound SVAG and GSOVG together 
against a common Polish opponent and was the catalyst for "Soviet 
protection". Jurisdictional tension was thus a double edged sword, allowing 
GSOVG troop violence to continue in the zone, yet at the same time 
encouraging GSOVG to protect Germans in the borderlands from Polish 
attacks. After suffering the humiliations of both Soviet and German 
occupation during the war, this was another bitter pill for the Poles to 
swallow; the taste of which remains strong after half a century. 
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